The DinamikPay investigation reaches bank accounts, crypto assets, property and corporate structures, showing how Turkish enforcement is increasingly targeting the financial infrastructure behind the illegal market
Türkiye's fight against illegal betting is gradually changing its primary focus. While one of the most visible measures in the spring was blocking access to illegal platforms, enforcement began moving during the summer towards the infrastructure that allows those platforms to function: bank accounts, payment intermediaries, financial flows and assets.
The investigation involving DinamikPay, launched on 25 August, is the latest example of that shift.
The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office opened proceedings over suspected facilitation of illegal betting and laundering of criminal proceeds. Investigators cited approximately TRY 17.9 billion in transaction volume during 2024 and 2025.
That figure requires an important distinction. It represents transaction volume examined within the investigation, not a judicial finding that TRY 17.9 billion consisted of funds of illegal origin.
In the initial operation, 13 people were detained, 126 bank and crypto accounts were blocked, and precautionary measures were imposed over vehicles, residential properties and land. A court also ordered a seizure measure over DinamikPay itself.
Subsequent actions added further financial elements. Authorities seized a total of 25.5 kg of gold belonging to Dinamik Elektronik Para ve Ödeme Hizmetleri AŞ and Dinamik Menkul Değerler AŞ, while Kemal Cenk Erdem, Chairman of the Board of Bitexen, was remanded in custody. Erdem denies the allegations against him.
All of these actions remain part of an ongoing criminal proceeding and do not constitute a finding of guilt.
The broader significance of the case becomes clearer when viewed against the development of Türkiye's approach over the past several months.
As early as May, an operation against illegal online gambling resulted in 108 people being detained and 5,151 URLs being blocked. At that stage, the most visible enforcement tool was still disruption of access to illegal platforms.
By July, control had moved deeper into the financial infrastructure. In another operation, investigators identified 6,314 bank accounts suspected of processing transactions linked to illegal betting platforms. Freeze instructions were sent simultaneously to 32 banks, while authorities also used the AI-assisted AVCI system to trace links between accounts and participants.
In August, authorities outlined the next technological direction. At a coordination meeting chaired by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, Türkiye discussed a more integrated AI- and data-driven approach capable of linking illegal websites and changing domains with technical information, accounts and payment flows. This remained a direction for development and coordination rather than evidence of a fully operational new system.
Against that background, DinamikPay represents the next practical level in the same progression.
The focus is no longer limited to the website through which a player reaches an illegal operator, or to an individual bank account through which funds move. The investigation extends into payment infrastructure, crypto assets, real estate and corporate structures.
Alongside DinamikPay, a separate Çankırı-centred investigation spanning 19 provinces involved accounts with approximately TRY 2.41 billion in transaction volume. Thirty-nine people were detained and 31 were subsequently remanded in custody.
Over the course of several months, a clear progression has emerged: from blocking access to platforms, to bank accounts and payment intermediaries, and increasingly deeper into the financial network behind the illegal business.
That also changes the logic of the fight against the illegal market.
A blocked domain can be replaced. A website can move, an affiliate channel can change and customers can be redirected to another address. It is considerably more difficult, however, for an illegal operation to continue functioning if it simultaneously loses access to bank accounts, payment routes, intermediaries and assets.
This is why the DinamikPay case is more than another operation against illegal betting. It shows how Türkiye is increasingly treating the illegal gambling market not simply as a network of websites, but as a financial system that must be traced and disrupted through the infrastructure that supports it.
The Turkish model cannot be transferred directly to other Balkan markets because the regulatory environment is different. But the question it raises is relevant across the region: does action against the illegal market stop at the level of the domain, or does it reach the money, intermediaries and infrastructure that allow an illegal operator to remain in business?




